Since 2014, the candidate numbers have disappeared from the ballot papers for the superintendent of education elections. Following criticism that fixed numbers distort voters' judgment, the 'rotation system' was introduced. This system changes the order of candidate names in each electoral district to prevent a specific candidate from monopolizing the top spot.
Certainly, the system has become fairer than before. However, another question arises. In elections without numbers, what criteria do voters use to choose a superintendent of education? Looking at the data from the recent three local elections, a clear trend is evident. In superintendent of education elections where three candidates ran after the introduction of the rotation system, the third-place candidate has never fallen below a vote share of 15%.
Examining the results of superintendent of education elections from the 6th local election in 2014 to the 8th in 2022, where only three candidates ran, there were a total of 12 cases. Among these, there was never a case where the third-place candidate received less than 15% of the votes. This means that in all regions, the third-place candidate surpassed the threshold of 15%, which is the standard for full reimbursement of election expenses.
In the 7th local election in 2018, three-way races were held in seven cities including Seoul, Incheon, Gwangju, Daegu, Chungcheongnam-do, Jeollanam-do, and Sejong. In Seoul, Cho Hui-yeon received 46.59%, Park Sun-young 36.15%, and Cho Young-dal 17.26% of the votes. In Incheon, Do Sung-hoon received 43.77%, Ko Seung-ui 29.79%, and Choi Sun-ja 26.43%. Gwangju had Jang Hwi-guk with 37.97%, Lee Jung-sun 35.80%, and Choi Young-tae 26.23%, while in Daegu, Kang Eun-hee received 40.73%, Kim Sa-yeol 38.09%, and Hong Deok-ryul 21.16%. Chungcheongnam-do had Kim Ji-cheol with 44.07%, Myeong No-hui 29.76%, and Jo Sam-rae 26.15%, and Jeollanam-do had Jang Seok-woong with 38.36%, Ko Seok-gyu 34.22%, and Oh In-seong 27.41%. In Sejong, Choi Gyo-jin received 50.07%, Choi Tae-ho 31.65%, and Song Myung-seok 18.26%.
A similar trend continued in the 8th local election in 2022. In Jeollabuk-do, Seo Geoseok received 43.52%, Cheon Ho-seong 40.08%, and Kim Yun-tae 16.38%. Jeollanam-do had Kim Dae-jung with 45.08%, Jang Seok-woong 37.05%, and Kim Dong-hwan 17.86%, while in Incheon, Do Sung-hoon received 41.46%, Choi Gye-woon 39.49%, and Seo Jeong-ho 19.03%. In Gyeongsangbuk-do, Im Jong-sik received 49.77%, Ma Suk-ja 27.73%, and Im Jun-hee 22.49%, and Chungcheongnam-do had Kim Ji-cheol with 33.79%, Lee Byeong-hak 27.29%, and Jo Young-jong 22.48%.
Ultimately, since the implementation of the rotation system, all third-place candidates in superintendent of education elections with three competitors have exceeded 15% of the vote share. This is not an occasional occurrence but a consistent pattern in election structures.
<b>Why do these results occur?</b>
First, it is due to the physical dispersion of votes. In elections with only three choices, there is limited room for votes to be divided. Unlike scenarios with five or more candidates, where votes can be spread out, weaker candidates in three-way races can establish a certain voting base more easily.
Second, after the disappearance of numbers, the proxy voting nature has become more pronounced. Although superintendent of education elections do not overtly reveal party affiliations, there has always been an underlying battle between progressive and conservative ideologies, as well as support or opposition to current educational administration. In the absence of numbers, voters naturally tend to vote based on names, backgrounds, and the signals they perceive from the candidates. In such three-way races, each faction secures a certain portion of their votes firmly, preventing the third-place vote share from easily deteriorating.
Third, the unique atmosphere of 'conscience voting' in superintendent of education elections also plays a role. Unlike elections for members of the National Assembly or metropolitan mayors, in superintendent of education elections, there are surprisingly many voters who cast their votes based on policies, educational philosophies, experience, and symbolism. If a specific candidate distinctly represents keywords such as innovative education, basic academic skills, special education, student rights, or the restoration of educational authority, they are likely to have a stable support base regardless of their chances of winning.
Fourth, the structural disadvantages faced by the third-place candidate have been reduced with the introduction of the rotation system. Previously, the fixed numbers drew excessive attention to the candidates at the top, leaving those at the back at a disadvantage. However, after the rotation system, candidates are evenly distributed at the front, middle, and back of the ballot papers. With the decrease in the 'number effect' based on the order, the third-place candidate can now maintain a stable voting base more effectively than before.
Actual figures support this trend. The average third-place vote share in the 12 cases is approximately 21.6%, with a median of about 21.8%. The lowest was the 16.38% recorded by Kim Yun-tae in Jeollabuk-do in 2022, while the highest was the 27.41% achieved by Oh In-seong in Jeollanam-do in 2018.
However, even in three-way races, the results varied slightly depending on the dynamics. When candidates with similar ideological tendencies overlapped, the average third-place vote share was generally lower. In cases where support bases of candidates overlapped, such as in Jeollabuk-do, Jeollanam-do, and Gyeongsangbuk-do in 2022, the average third-place vote share dropped to about 18.9%. On the other hand, when clear ideological factions faced off, the average third-place vote share rose to about 23.2%. Ultimately, the most critical variable determining the lower limit of the third-place vote share was not the number of candidates but how much the ideological factions overlapped.
<b>At this point, the 2026 Jeollabuk-do superintendent of education election comes into focus again.</b>
If this election maintains a three-way race until the end, based on historical data, there is a high likelihood that the third-place candidate will exceed 15%. At least, the cases after the introduction of the rotation system indicate so. The full reimbursement threshold for election expenses is not just a simple expectation but a factual boundary repeatedly confirmed by actual data.
However, Jeollabuk-do is also an area that needs to be closely monitored. Since the introduction of the rotation system, the lowest third-place vote share in a three-way race nationwide was the 16.38% recorded in Jeollabuk-do in 2022. While the trend suggests a possibility of surpassing 15%, if a similar factional split occurs again, the third-place vote share in Jeollabuk-do could drop to that critical threshold.
Although the numbers have disappeared, the structure of voter sentiment remains. Even without numbers, voters have divided their choices based on the factions, personalities, and educational issues they believe in. Therefore, in a three-way race, the third-place candidate has always secured a certain share. While the rotation system may have eliminated the number effect, it has not changed the terrain of votes created by the three-way dynamics.
<b>If the 2026 Jeollabuk-do superintendent of education election becomes a three-way race, there is one question.</b>
The question is not whether the third-place candidate will exceed 15%, but whether Jeollabuk-do will record another near-bottom third-place vote share nationally, as in 2022, or create a stable third-place at the average level of other regions.
📝 Summary:
Since 2014, candidate numbers have been removed from superintendent of education election ballots to prevent bias. A rotation system was introduced to shuffle candidate names and ensure fairness. Despite this change, third-place candidates consistently receive at least 15% of the votes in three-way races.
🗣️ Natural Korean Translation:
2014년 이후 교육감 선거에서 후보 번호가 사라졌습니다. 투표자의 판단을 왜곡하는 고정 번호에 대한 비판을 따르며 '로테이션 시스템'이 도입되었습니다. 이 변경에도 불구하고, 3인 선거에서 3위 후보는 일관되게 최소 15%의 표를 받았습니다.
❓ Comprehension Questions:
1. Why were candidate numbers removed from the superintendent of education election ballots?
투표용지에서 후보 번호가 사라진 이유는 무엇인가요?
2. What is the purpose of the rotation system introduced in these elections?
이 선거에서 도입된 로테이션 시스템의 목적은 무엇인가요?
3. How have third-place candidates performed in superintendent of education elections since the introduction of the rotation system?
로테이션 시스템 도입 이후 교육감 선거에서 3위 후보들은 어떻게 성과를 거뒀나요?
💡 Vocabulary Learning:
1. Monopolizing (동사) - 독점하다
- To have exclusive control over something.
- 특정 후보가 최상의 자리를 독점하는 것을 막기 위해 이 시스템이 도입되었습니다.
- The rotation system was introduced to prevent a specific candidate from monopolizing the top spot.
2. Dispersed (형용사) - 분산된
- Spread out or scattered over an area.
- 3개의 선택지로 이루어진 선거에서는 투표가 분산되기 어렵습니다.
- In elections with only three choices, there is limited room for votes to be dispersed.
3. Overtly (부사) - 공공연히
- Done openly or publicly.
- 교육감 선거에서는 정당 소속이 명시적으로 나타나지 않습니다.
- Superintendent of education elections do not overtly reveal party affiliations.
4. Faction (명사) - 당파
- A group within a larger organization that has different ideas or goals from the main group.
- 각 당파는 특정 부분의 투표를 확보하여 3위 표율을 안정적으로 유지합니다.
- Each faction secures a certain portion of their votes firmly.
5. Threshold (명사) - 한계
- The level at which something begins or changes.
- 15%는 선거 비용의 전액 환급을 위한 기준입니다.
- 15% is the standard for full reimbursement of election expenses.
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